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ABSTRACT
The optimal currency area (OCA) concept is central to the economic analysis of monetary
unions, as it clearly identifies the relevant optimizing tradeoff: extension of the area over which a
single currency is used enhances allocative efficiency but reduces the possibility of tailoring monetary
policy to the needs of different areas.  Empirical work has verified the importance of various features
of economies that make them strong or weak candidates for a common currency arrangement, but
existing studies do not permit actual quantification of costs and benefits.  Thus the OCA concept
remains less than fully operational. A second relevant body of theory is that pertaining to currency
crises. Formal models clarify various points concerning speculative attacks on fixed exchange rates,
and show how abrupt reserve losses and depreciations can occur rationally at times when no major
shocks are hitting the system.  These models support the notion that a fixed (but adjustable)
exchange-rate regime is not a viable option for most nations, given high mobility of financial capital.
Also discussed is the recently-developed fiscal theory of price level determination, which if valid
would have major implications for monetary-fiscal arrangements in currency unions.  This theory does
not contend that fiscal behavior drives an accommodative monetary authority, but rather that the price
level roughly mimics the pattern of the government bond stock rather than base money when their
paths differ drastically.  An example is exposited in which there are two rational expectations
solutions for an economy with a constant money supply: a traditional solution in which the price level
is also constant and a fiscalist solution in which the price level and bond stock both explode as time
passes. These solutions represent competing hypotheses about the behavior of actual economies; the
paper suggests that the former is more likely to prevail in actuality.
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The purpose of this paper is to review the economic theory relevant to the subject
of  monetary unions, in principle to provide a background for the remainder of the
conference.  This is a difficult assignment, for there is only a small bit of theory that is
directly and strongly relevant to the topic, whereas the amount of theory that is of
possibly significant relevance is huge—too large to cover in a single paper of moderate
length.  Accordingly, I have had to make some difficult and debatable choices regarding
content.
The one theoretical topic that is of clear and direct relevance is the theory of
optimal currency areas, since the basic purpose of that analysis is to specify conditions
under which it is (or is not) economically advantageous for a group of economies to
adopt a single currency.  But direct relevance does not imply that an extensive discussion
of this topic is appropriate because, on the one hand, its central propositions are well
known and, on the other hand, the essential concepts involved are perhaps so difficult to
measure as to render the theory virtually non-operational.  Accordingly, just one section
of the paper, Section 2, will be devoted to the subject of optimal currency areas.
A second topic that seems worthy of some review is the recently-prominent
theory of exchange-rate (and other financial) crises.  This topic is relevant because one of
its main practical messages is, as I understand it, that with unregulated international
financial flows the relevant choice for a group of economies is between currency union
and floating exchange rates.  In other words, the apparent intermediate option of a fixed
but possibly adjustable exchange rate is actually close to infeasible.  Accordingly, a short
review of this literature is in order and will be attempted in Section 3.2
Third, the topic of monetary union envisions a single currency for economies that
have distinct governments and thus, to some extent, potentially distinct fiscal authorities.
Consequently, the subject of the relationship between fiscal and monetary policies arises.
As a whole, this subject is too extensive to be reviewed here.  A particular issue that has
quite recently been the subject of considerable theoretical attention, however, is the so-
called “fiscal theory of price level determination.”  This is a topic of fundamental
importance that has been developed in a number of writings that are theoretically
sophisticated and rather difficult to comprehend without extensive study.  It is also a
topic in which I have taken some prior interest.  An exposition of the issues is therefore
provided in Section 4 of the paper.  It should be clearly stated at the outset that, due to my
previous involvement, this presentation does not pretend to be a balanced, unbiased
overview but is instead a partisan attempt to justify a particular position regarding this
theory—the position that I consider to be most appropriate.
Finally, a short summary of the paper is included as Section 5.
2. Optimal Currency Areas
The optimal currency area concept was introduced, as is well known, by Mundell
(1961).  Despite appearances, the foregoing should be regarded as a striking statement
because it is surprising that such a basic idea would not have been developed previously.
Nevertheless, the statement is, as well as I have been able to determine, correct.  I will
return to this point below, and will offer an explanation for the reason that the concept
had not been developed previously, but for the moment let us continue the substantive
theoretical discussion.  The crucial tradeoff identified by Mundell is, according to my3
own textbook,
1 that “an extension of the area over which a single currency prevails
enhances [microeconomic] efficiency but reduces the possibility of monetary policy
responses to shocks [or conditions] that affect various subareas differently” (1996, p.
258).  The wider the area, that is, the greater are the efficiency benefits of possessing a
single medium of exchange and medium of account,
2 but the smaller the area, the greater
are the possibilities of tailoring monetary policy to (temporary) local needs.  Somewhere
between one currency for the entire world and one for each country (or for each city, or
neighborhood, …) lies the optimum.  The plot of net benefits versus number of currencies
might be quite flat, of course, over a wide range that includes the optimum.
In a sense, the foregoing is all there is to be said in terms of pure theory, but most
authors would discuss the topic at somewhat greater length.  The recent and highly-
regarded graduate level textbook by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, pp. 632-4) sustains the
discussion for approximately two full pages by listing four main benefits and four main
costs to a pair of countries from having a common currency.  These are, in the words of
Obstfeld and Rogoff, as follows, with benefits listed first.
B1. Reduced transaction costs from currency conversion ….
B2. Reduced accounting costs and greater predictability of relative prices
for firms doing business in both countries.
B3. Insulation from monetary disturbances and speculative bubbles
that might otherwise lead to temporary unnecessary fluctuations in
real exchange rates ….
                                               
1 See McCallum (1996, pp. 258-9 and 209-214).
2  For simplicity, I here assume that the two are the same.  This is of course not logically
necessary, but will usually be the case except in environments of very high inflation.4
B4. Less political pressure for trade protection because of sharp shifts
in real exchange rates.
C1. Individual regions in a currency union forgo the ability to use
monetary policy to respond to region-specific macroeconomic disturbances ….
C2. Regions in a currency union give up the option to use inflation
to reduce the real burden of public debt ….
C3. … [Political and strategic problems arise in determining how
member countries split seignorage revenues ….
C4. Avoiding speculative attacks in the transition from individual
currencies to a common currency can be a major problem ….
Here it would appear that B1, B2, B3, C1, and C2 accord nicely with the simple
statement expressed above whereas C4 represents only a transitional difficulty
3 and B4
and C3 are basically political rather than economic in nature.  If I were making a list of
the Obstfeld-Rogoff type, however, I would add another distinct benefit as follows: the
existence of a common currency tends to bring a greater degree of integration to financial
and non-financial markets in the two countries.
Merely stating that this optimization problem exists does nothing, obviously, to
solve it for any two actual countries such as the U.K. and Germany.  The relevant issue
for the present paper is what theoretical writings have to say about the way in which the
optimization problem should be handled in practice.  In his original paper, Mundell
                                               
3  If transitional costs are to be considered, one should certainly count the resource and
educational costs of conversion by one or more regions to the new common currency.5
 (1961) emphasized factor mobility, especially labor mobility, as a crucial consideration.
Subsequent contributions by McKinnon (1963), Kenen (1969), and others have proposed
other criteria for consideration.  In particular, McKinnon emphasized openness, measured
by the share of tradable goods in a country’s output, whereas Kenen focussed on the
extent of product diversification in production.  For an extensive review of this literature,
including references to many additional authors, see Ishiyama (1975) or Tower and
Willett (1976).
After reflecting on some of these writings, my own impression was that there is
significant merit to several of the proposed criteria, in other words, that no one of them is
itself sufficient. Furthermore, each of the criteria is extremely difficult to implement
quantitatively.  So when I began this paper, I found it difficult to avoid the conclusion
that the optimal currency area (OCA) concept is, in practice, non-operational.
Consequently, my first draft expressed the opinion that, although the concept reflects an
important and interesting tradeoff, in actual practice one can not go far beyond the rather
limp conclusion that currency unions “will be relatively more attractive for small, open
economies that engage in a large volume of international trade (relative to their size)”
whereas “floating rates … are more suitable for large and relatively self-contained
economies” (McCallum, 1996, p. 225).
Since writing the first draft, I have seen a pair of papers by Bayoumi and
Eichengreen (1996, 1997) whose purpose is to operationalize the OCA concept.  Their
approach in the 1997 paper is to develop quantitative measures or proxies pertaining to
size, trade linkages, and dissimilarity of aggregate shocks for different European6
countries each considered relative to Germany.
4  An index of unsuitability for
membership in the contemplated currency area is constructed (for each country except
Germany) by using coefficients obtained in a cross-section regression whose dependent
variable is the variability of bilateral exchange rates with Germany.  This index indicates
that Austria, Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Switzerland would be relatively
suitable for inclusion in the union, whereas Denmark, Finland, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom would be relatively unsuitable. These groupings seem
sensible enough that I would have to agree that Bayoumi and Eichengreen have made
notable progress toward operationalization of the OCA theory.
 5
Nevertheless, it must be recognized that their approach yields only rankings of
suitability, not actual cost-benefit measures that would indicate where the line separating
included vs. excluded currencies should be drawn.  Accordingly, one could still argue
that true operationality of the OCA concept has not been achieved.  To emphasize this
point, it might be argued that if there was ever a situation that cried out for application of
the OCA calculus, it was the January 1999 creation of the European Monetary Union.
But Bayoumi and Eichengreen’s (1996) review of numerous studies indicates that they do
not actually provide estimates indicating which countries should, and which should not,
be members of the Euro area.  The European Union publication One Market, One Money
presented some worthwhile analysis—especially in its attempt to estimate the resource
                                               
4  Some earlier work of this general type is reviewed and evaluated by Edison and Melvin
(1990).
5 In my textbook, one end-of-chapter problem asks the student to consider “would it be
more advantageous for Portugal or France to have fixed exchange rates with Spain?”
(1996, p. 226).  The Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997, p. 768) results for selected
bilateral comparisons indicate that “Portugal” is the correct answer, which is certainly
what the textbook intended.7
savings of a single currency rather than truly fixed exchange rates among national
currencies—but all in all it too seems not to pass the test.
6
Let us now return to questions relating to the history of the optimum currency
area’s crucial tradeoff concept.  Was Mundell (1961) actually the first to express it
clearly?  Yeager (1976) mentions another publication of the same year, namely Balassa
(1961, pp. 263-8).  But examination indicates that the latter gives consideration to the
type of costs and benefits implied by the tradeoff, without ever posing the issue in terms
of an “optimal area” concept.  Indeed, the same can be said for an earlier publication by
Yeager himself (1959a).  In addition, some other earlier writings of relevance are cited by
Ishiyama (1975) and by Tower and Willett (1976).  But even if one were to conclude that
the concept had been clearly formulated by someone prior to Mundell, which is
debatable, it would nevertheless be striking that its formulation did not occur until some
date not long before 1961.  So let us move on to the more interesting question, why did
this recognition not come sooner?
To the latter question there is, I believe, a rather clear-cut (although conjectural)
answer.  It is that prior to the 1950s, the predominant position among international and
monetary economists was that some metallic monetary standard should be adopted by all
countries.  The most common position was that the same monetary standard, typically the
gold standard, should prevail everywhere.
7  Then, in the absence of restrictions on gold
                                               
6  Certainly, actual decisions whether to participate were not based on optimal-currency-
area analyses, but that is another matter.  The issue here is whether there are any
convincing economic studies.
7  Mill (1848) puts the matter very nicely, as he does so often, as follows: “Let us suppose
that all countries had the same currency, as in the progress of political improvement they
one day will have…” (Book III, Ch. XX, § 2).8
 flows, there would be a unified monetary system; the fact that different units of account
would be used in different countries would not negate the existence of a unified medium
of exchange and medium of account.
8  Furthermore, even if different metals were used by
some countries, there would be no scope for floating exchange rates or for the associated
possibility of tailoring monetary policy to different conditions in different regions.
The great break with this orthodoxy came, of course, with the publication of
Friedman’s “The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates” (1953).  This, together with other
pro-floating rate writings, including Lutz (1954), Sohmen (1957), and Yeager (1959b),
altered the intellectual climate enough to permit the relevant issues to arise.  In
Friedman’s essay there is no attempt to balance off the benefits and costs of floating
rates, but that is so because the paper’s task was to persuade analysts of the existence of
benefits.  But in this task the paper was successful enough that within a few years
Mundell could take a more balanced perspective and look for an optimizing tradeoff.
Another development was necessary, furthermore, before Friedman’s.  Since the
main benefit of a floating exchange rate is that it permits monetary policy to be different
in different regions, and therefore to be usable for offsetting demand shocks that would
have undesirable (albeit temporary) effects on output and employment, there needed to be
professional recognition that monetary policy could be useful in this way.  In other
words, there needed to be recognition of the possibility of monetary stabilization policy
of the type that we now call Keynesian.  It is my own belief that Keynes’s General
Theory (1936) was largely unsuccessful as an undertaking in economic theory, but it
                                               
8  If gold is the standard metal in various countries that have different coinage systems,
one might regard gold as the common medium of account even though units of account
would differ with different coinage systems.9
succeeded spectacularly in calling the profession’s attention to the importance of
considering short-run issues.  The point, from the perspective of the present discussion, is
that the recognition of some role for monetary stabilization policy provides one potential
benefit for floating exchange rates, i.e., for the possible optimality of more than a single
worldwide currency.  This particular role is not strictly necessary, for different countries
could have different preferences regarding long-run average inflation rates—perhaps for
public finance reasons—but the stabilization role is more prominent and would remain
relevant even if average inflation preferences were the same everywhere.
9
The discussion to this point has proceeded as if floating rates and currency unions
were the only possibilities.  In other words, we have not mentioned the possibility of
countries with fixed but potentially adjustable exchange rates.  Experiences during recent
years—most prominently in Europe in 1992 and 1993, Mexico in 1994-95, and Asia in
1997-98—have strengthened the belief that the fixed-but-adjustable arrangement is
illusory for the reason that was spelled out so effectively by Friedman (1953).  This
reason, of course, is that fixed (but adjustable) rates tend to invite speculative attacks.  In
Friedman’s words:
Because the exchange rate is changed infrequently and only to meet
substantial difficulties, a change tends to come well after the onset of
difficulty, to be postponed as long as possible, and to be made only after
substantial pressure on the exchange rate has accumulated.  In consequence,
                                               
9  For quite a few years, especially during the 1960s and 1970s, it was widely believed
that different countries might desire different average inflation rates because of different
preferences regarding output and employment relative to inflation, but in more recent
time professional opinion has moved strongly toward the Friedman (1966)-Phelps (1967)
position that there exists no long-run tradeoff.10
there is seldom any doubt about the direction in which an exchange rate
 will be changed, if it is changed.  In the interim between the suspicion of
a possible change in the rate and its actual change, there is every incentive
to sell the country’s currency if a devaluation is expected… or to buy it if
an appreciation is expected. (1953, p. 164)
Friedman’s argument is rather compelling and may seem more convincing now
than ever before.  Nevertheless, a more formal literature concerning speculative attacks
on exchange rates has built up over the past 20 years, and deserves some attention in any
review of theory relevant to the topic of monetary unification.  To provide a brief review
is the purpose of the next section of the paper.  Comments on the currency-board
possibility will be included toward the end of this next section.
3. The Theory of Currency Crises
The currency crisis or speculative attack literature came to prominence with
writings by Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984a).  Extensive recent reviews of
the theory by Flood and Marion (1998), Marion (1999), and Garber and Svensson (1995)
indicate clearly, however, that the crucial ideas were present somewhat earlier in a
comparatively neglected paper by Salant and Henderson (1978).
10
The simplest and cleanest model is one developed by Flood and Garber (1984a).
As a preliminary step, let us consider how a floating exchange rate would behave in a
small open economy in which prices are highly flexible, so that employment and output
are always close to their “natural rate” levels.  The analytical framework typically utilized
in the literature is normally described as also requiring uncovered interest parity,
                                               
10  On this, see especially Flood and Marion (1998, fn. 1).11
purchasing power parity, and constant values for output and the real interest rate in the
home economy.  The following presentation indicates how the latter three requirements
can be dispensed with.
Let Mt be the stock of base money, Pt the price level, St the price of foreign
exchange, Qt the real exchange rate, Yt the rate of output, and Rt the nominal interest rate.
For all of these except the last, let lower case letters denote logarithms, e.g., st = log St;
for the last we have rt = Rt - EtDpt+1, the real interest rate.  Also, let “*” denote a foreign
or rest-of-world variable.  Then we write the model as follows.
(1a) yt = b0 + Etyt+1 + b1rt  + b2(xt – Etxt+1) + ht                                              b1 < 0, b2 > 0
(1b) mt – pt = c0 + c1yt + c2Rt + et                                       c1 > 0, c2 < 0
(1c) xt = a0 + a1qt + a2yt + a3y*t  + xt                                                              a1, a3 > 0, a2 < 0
(1d) qt = st – pt  + p*t
(1e) Rt = R*t + EtDst+1 + zt
(1f) yt =  t y .
Here (1a) and (1b) reflect dynamic optimizing versions of relations of the IS and LM type
that have been justified by McCallum and Nelson (1999), among others, with the former
augmented by trade flows, xt representing the log of exports minus the log of imports.
The value of xt is modelled in (1c) as depending on the real exchange rate and income
levels at home and abroad.  Equation (1d) is an identity; (1e) represents uncovered
interest parity with a random, time-variable risk premium, and (1f) assumes that, with
price flexibility, output equals its (exogenous) market-clearing natural rate value.
Of course, we also have the identities
(2)  rt = Rt - EtDpt+112
(3)  r*t = R*t - EtDp*t+1,
so these plus (1d) permit us to rewrite (1e) as
(4)  rt = r*t + Etqt+1 – qt + zt.
Then it can be seen that relations (1a), (1c), (1f), and (4) comprise a subsystem that
determines the dynamic behavior of yt, qt, xt, and rt given exogenous processes for ht, xt,
zt, y t, and all foreign variables.  Consequently, we can substitute (1d) and (1e) into (1b)
to obtain
(5)  mt – (st + p*t – qt) = c0 + y t + c2(R*t + EtDst+1 + zt) + et,
and the latter can be expressed as
(6 ) mt – st = g + a(Etst+1 – st) + vt                                              a < 0,
where vt is a highly composite stochastic term, with Evt = 0, that reflects the behavior of
numerous variables, all of which are exogenous to st and mt.
   Thus we end up with equation (6) to describe the behavior of  the exchange rate in
a flexible-price economy. Because it is of the same form as the Cagan (1956) formula for
money demand, except with st appearing where pt usually appears, the behavior of the
exchange rate in this setting is quite familiar.   In particular we know that, on average
over an extended period of time, the exchange rate will depreciate at the rate of growth of
the money stock: if the money stock grows at the rate m, then the exchange rate will
depreciate at the rate m.  Crucially, we also know that the desired level of     mt – st at any
time will be negatively related to m, since smaller real money holdings are desired when
their expected depreciation rate is high.  This simple and familiar model provides a
convenient vehicle for the analysis in the currency crisis literature.  To keep matters as
simple as possible, while still making the basic points, the stochastic disturbance term vt13
is often  neglected, i.e., the case of perfect foresight is utilized.  In what follows, we shall
follow that common practice.  Then we find, via simple rational expectations (RE)
analysis, that with mt = mt-1 + m the exchange rate behaves as
(7)         st = - g - am + mt.
After these preliminaries, let us now consider an economy with a fixed exchange
rate.  We have specified that st is the log of the exchange rate and now we suppose that its
value is fixed at the value  s ; i.e., we have the fixed rate st = s .  To maintain this value,
the log of Mt must be kept constant at (say) m .   But suppose that the government of the
economy in question engages in another activity besides exchange-rate fixing that
requires positive growth at the rate m of the domestic credit portion of the monetary base.
(Let M = DC + FR, where M is the base, FR is the stock of foreign exchange reserves,
and DC is the domestic credit portion of M.)  To keep Mt constant while expanding DCt,
FRt must fall as time passes.  If the growth rate of DCt is maintained permanently at m,
and log Mt is kept at m , then eventually FRt will fall to zero, at which point it would
become impossible to maintain the fixed exchange rate.
11
But with rational expectations—i.e., perfect foresight in the absence of shocks—
the fixed exchange rate regime will collapse before FRt falls to zero.  For by the time that
FRt reaches zero, the exchange rate that would prevail in the absence of official
intervention—i.e., with a floating rate—would be higher than the previously fixed value.
Thus there would occur a discrete, abrupt depreciation at this time, a fall in value of the
home country currency.  But with rational expectations, market participants would know
                                               
11  Actually the situation is more complex in that the authorities could have a positive or
negative level of reserves that they will maintain after collapse of the fixed rate.  For
expositional simplicity, that level is (as usual) taken to be zero.14
that this is going to happen, and when it will happen, so before then they would become
unwilling to hold the domestic currency, since to do so would be to incur a capital loss
that is anticipated.  So, instead, they sell off the domestic currency in exchange for
foreign exchange reserves earlier.
In the basic Flood-Garber (1984a) model, it is assumed that when the fixed-rate
regime breaks down, a floating-rate regime takes its place and is maintained indefinitely
thereafter.
12  Let  t s ~  be the “shadow exchange rate” that would prevail at time t if a
floating-rate regime were to go into effect at t with FRt = 0;
(8)       t s ~  = - (g + am) + dt,
where dt = log DCt.   Then according to the basic model, a currency crisis occurs when  t s ~
rises to the level s .   There is then no discontinuity in st and thus no anticipated capital
gain or loss; instead there is an abrupt fall in FR as market participants use their holdings
of domestic currency to purchase foreign exchange from the central bank.  In addition,
there is an upward jump (from zero to m) in the expected inflation rate, and therefore an
upward jump in the nominal rate of interest—a jump that makes asset holders satisfied
with the reduced stock of money.  What about the possibility of an earlier attack?  Such
would not occur because prior to the point in time at which  t s ~ = s , the former would be
the smaller so there would be capital losses to participants in a speculative attack against
                                               
12  Note that some assumption must be adopted regarding policy behavior after the
breakdown, or the model will be incomplete. Various alternative assumptions are
considered in the literature; one of these will be analysed below.15
the currency if it were “successful.” Thus there is no incentive for an earlier attact to
occur.
13
In sum, the basic model explains why there are abrupt losses of foreign exchange
holdings by central banks, abrupt changes in interest rates, and a regime change to a
floating rate at the time of a currency crisis, even though no major external triggering
event happens at that time.  It also explains (in principle) the time at which this collapse
will occur, since the growth of mt and therefore  t s ~  is a deterministic function of time.
14
In an important sense, however, the model does not actually explain the occurrence of a
collapse, because the model begins with the assumption that the country’s government is
attempting to maintain a fixed exchange rate while conducting another policy activity that
is incompatible with such maintenance of that fixed rate.  In such a situation it is obvious
that one of the two incompatible policy goals must eventually be given up, and the basic
model just presumes that the other policy activity has precedence over keeping the
exchange rate pegged at s .
The literature contains several extensions of the basic model, however, that are
more ambitious in this regard.  Several notable examples have been developed and
discussed by Obstfeld (1986, 1994, 1996), but we can outline the essential ingredients
with a simple extension of the Flood-Garber model described above.
15  Accordingly, let
us modify the basic model by assuming that ( i) in the absence of a speculative attack, the
                                               
13  From the individual asset holder’s viewpoint, there would be costs of holding more
foreign exchange in their portfolio, costs that would outweigh the negligible effect to be
had on the precipitation of a general speculative attack.
14  With the assumption that the post-collapse level of FR is zero, then  t s ~ = - g - am + d0 +
mt, where d0 is the log of “initial” DC.  Thus t at collapse time is (s  + g + am - d0)/m. We
see that a lower m or higher s  will extend the life of the fixed-rate regime.
15  This extension was first proposed by Flood and Garber (1984b).16
rate of growth of domestic credit is zero, i.e., m0 = 0, but ( ii) if an attack occurs then DCt
grows thereafter at the positive rate m1.  In addition, it is assumed that this value satisfies
m1 > log (M0/DC0)/(-a).
In this situation, there are two RE (perfect foresight) equilibria.  If there is no
speculative attack, then with zero growth in domestic credit there is no literal
inconsistency with the fixed exchange rate st = s , so it can survive indefinitely.
Alternatively, if there is an attack, then there will be an abrupt fall in reserves, a
depreciation of the exchange rate to the value  t s ~  = - g - am1 + dt, and  t s ~  will henceforth
grow indefinitely at the rate m1.  Thus the fact that policy is not unconditionally dedicated
to maintaining the fixed rate, but would in the face of a major attack surrender to
speculators and thereafter pursue an alternative goal, implies that the fixed-rate policy is
subject to attack.
16 There are several other models, described by Obstfeld (1996), that
lead to similar conclusions.
What should one make of the foregoing, with regard to the feasibility of a fixed
but potentially adjustable exchange rate?  Garber and Svensson (1995) begin the relevant
section of their prominent survey paper with the following statement: “A salient feature
of fixed exchange rate regimes is their inevitable collapse into some other policy regime”
(1995, p. 1891).  Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), by contrast, state that “…there are no
insurmountable technical obstacles to fixing exchange rates.  Most central banks have
access to enough foreign exchange resources to beat down a speculative attack of any
magnitude…” (1995, pp. 77-78).  Despite these apparently conflicting statements,
                                               
16 Note that in this variant of the model there is an abrupt depreciation at the time of
attack, but in a manner that does not imply anticipated capital gains or losses.17
however, there is actually no substantive disagreement  between these two pairs of
authors.  In particular, Garber and Svensson (1995, p. 1892) recognize that “a central
bank can always preserve a fixed exchange rate through a sustained high interest rate or,
equivalently, through a sufficiently drastic contraction in [the] monetary base;” their
inevitability of collapse stems from “…the presumption that the adherence to a fixed
exchange rate is a secondary policy—it is to be maintained only as long as it is
compatible with policies that have priority.”  And for their part, Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1995, p. 78) finish the incomplete sentence quoted above with the proviso, ‘…provided
they are willing to subordinate all the other goals of monetary policy.”  In fact, Obstfeld
and Rogoff continue as follows: “If central banks virtually always have the resources to
crush speculators, why do they suffer periodic humiliation by foreign exchange markets?
The problem, of course, is that very few central banks will cling to an exchange-rate
target without regard to what is happening in the rest of the economy.  Domestic political
realities simply will not allow it, even when agreements with foreign governments are at
stake” (1995, p. 79).  In sum, Obstfeld and Rogoff agree with the Garber-Svensson
conclusion that, in practice, fixed (but adjustable) exchange rate regimes are not a viable
option for most economies, basically for the reasons identified by Friedman and
developed in the currency-crisis literature.
What about the notion that creation of a currency board provides one way, short
of monetary union, for an economy to maintain a fixed exchange rate?  From the
foregoing discussion, the answer seems reasonably clear.  The creation of a currency
board gives rise to an institution that is more difficult and costly to dismantle, when it
interferes with some other policy objective, than a more conventional fixed-rate18
arrangement.  But unless maintenance of the currency board arrangement has priority
over all other macroeconomic objectives, eventually the currency board, too, will break
down.  The same might even be said for membership in a currency union, but the costs of
departing from a union are presumably even greater than those from the termination of a
currency board.  The other members of the union might conceivably even go to war to
prevent its breakup.
4. The Fiscal Theory of Price Level Determination
During the past few years, a striking body of literature has appeared in which it is
argued that general price level determination is essentially a fiscal, rather than monetary,
phenomenon.  The most prominent papers to date are those of Woodford (1994, 1995,
1998), Sims (1994, 1996), and Cochrane (1998), but there are several others of
significance.
17  If the theory expounded in these papers were valid empirically, there
would be major implications for the manner in which fiscal and monetary policies are
related in a monetary union, as Woodford (1996), Sims (1997), and Bergin (1996)
emphasize.  The purpose of the present section is to describe this theory and explain why
I believe that it is not empirically valid, but instead is basically misleading.
18  For
simplicity, the argument will be conducted in terms of a single closed economy, but if the
theory is misleading in that case it will also be misleading regarding the relationship
between monetary and fiscal policies in the more complex setting of a monetary union.
                                               
17   Some of these are Leeper (1991), Bergin (1996), Dupor (1997), and Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (1997).
18   My argument has been presented previously in McCallum (1998, 1999a); a somewhat
similar and complementary position is taken by Buiter (1998), in a study that discusses
several other issues as well.19
At the outset it should be emphasized just how drastically unorthodox or counter-
traditional the fiscal theory of price level determination is.
19  Specifically, it does not
merely suggest that fiscal as well as monetary policy stances are significant for price
level behavior; instead it virtually claims that only fiscal policy is relevant.  In the
prototype model to be sketched below, the price level moves over time in a manner that is
very closely related to the path of government bonds outstanding and entirely unlike the
path of the stock of high-powered money.  Therefore it is not the case that the argument
involves fiscal behavior that drives an accommodative monetary authority, as when rapid
base money growth serves to finance a fiscal deficit.
20  Furthermore, the type of model
typically utilized in the literature’s analysis is not of the overlapping generations type, in
which the Ricardian equivalence proposition is known to fail.  Instead, the model is
basically of the Sidrauski-Brock type, in which Ricardian equivalence results are
normally obtained, i.e., results implying that bond-financial tax changes have no effect on
the price level or other macroeconomic variables of primary interest.
21  In such a setting,
fiscalist positions are truly startling.
As a background for illustrating these drastic results, let us begin with an
orthodox analysis of price level determination in an extremely simple and transparent
setting.  Suppose that the (per capita) money demand function for a closed economy is of
the textbook form
(11) mt – pt = c0 + c1yt + c2Rt + vt c1 > 0, c2 < 0,
                                               
19   In what follows, I shall for brevity often refer to the latter as the “fiscal” or “fiscalist”
theory.
20   Thus the theory is quite different from that of Sargent and Wallace (1981).
21    For an analysis of this model, see McCallum (1984).20
where mt, pt, and yt are logs of the (base) money stock, price level, and output (income)
for period t, while Rt denotes a one-period nominal interest rate.  The disturbance vt is
taken for simplicity to be white noise.  It is well known that there are rigorous dynamic
general equilibrium models with optimizing agents that will justify (11) as an
approximation to a combination of implied Euler equations (first-order conditions).
22
The present exposition is intended to convey the essential features of a full optimizing
analysis while ignoring some of the details.
Furthermore, let us assume that the economy is one in which output and the real
rate of interest are constant over time.  Then (11) collapses to
(12) mt – pt = g + a (Etpt+1 – pt) + vt a = c2,
which is the familiar Cagan specification for money demand.  And let us consider cases
in which the growth rate of the (base) money stock is kept constant by the central bank,
so that
(13) mt = mt-1 + m,
where m is the growth rate of the money stock.  These relations plus rational expectations
determine the behavior of pt and mt for time periods t = 1,2,….  It is possible that the
structure was different prior to period 1.
In this setting, the orthodox bubble-free or “fundamentals” rational expectations
(RE) solution for pt can be found by conjecturing that it is of the form
(14) pt = f0 + f1mt-1 + f2vt,
since mt-1 and vt are evidently the system’s only state variables.  In that case we have
Etpt+1 = f0 + f1(mt-1 + m) so substitution of the latter, (13), and (14) into (12) yields
                                               
22    See, for example, Woodford (1995) or McCallum and Nelson (1999).21
 (15) mt-1 + m = g + a [f0 + f1(mt-1 + m)] + (1-a) [f0 + f1mt-1 + f2vt] + vt.
The latter implies that for (14) to be a solution, i.e., to hold for all realizations of vt and
mt-1, we must have satisfaction of the undetermined-coefficient (UC) conditions
(16) 1 = af1 + (1-a) f1
0 = (1-a) f2 + 1.
m = g + af1m + (1-a) f0 + af0
Thus we have that f1 = 1, f2 = - 1/(1-a) and f0 = m - g - am, i.e., the solution is
(17) pt = m (1-a) - g + mt-1 – 1/(1-a)vt
          = mt – (g + am) – vt/(1-a).
Here we see that pt grows one-for-one with mt, i.e., the price level Pt moves on
average in proportion to the money stock Mt, but fluctuates around this average position
in response to realizations of vt, with pt being temporarily reduced by positive money
demand shocks (vt > 0) or boosted by negative shocks (vt < 0).  This is clearly an entirely
traditional—one might even say “monetarist”—analysis of price level behavior in the
economy in question.
Now for an even simpler special case, let us suppose that the money growth rate is
zero, i.e., that m = 0 so that mt = m.  Then the solution for pt is
(18) pt = m - g - vt/(1-a).
And, finally, if money demand shocks were absent we would have pt = m - g.
It must be noted, however, that while (17) and its special case (18) give the well-
behaved, orthodox, bubble-free RE solutions for this model, there are other expressions
as well that satisfy the model (12)(13) with RE.  For simplicity, let us consider the special
case with constant mt = m, but now conjecture a solution of the form22
(19) pt = y0 + y1 pt-1 + y2vt + y3vt-1,
instead of pt = f0 + f2vt.  Then working through the same type of analysis as before, one
finds that the UC conditions analogous to (16) are
(20) 0 = a y1
2 + (1-a) y1
0 = a y1 y2 + a y3 + (1-a) y2 + 1
0 = a y1 y3 + (1-a) y3
m = g + a y0 + a y1 y0 + (1-a) y0.
We see, now, that the first of these has two roots y1
(1) = 0 and y1
(2) = (a-1)/a.  If the
former is the relevant root, then we find that y3 = 0, y2 = -1/(1-a), and y0 = m - g so that
the same expression as in (18) is obtained.  But if y1
(2) is relevant, then y3 = -1/a and y0
= (m -g)/a while any value of y2 is possible.  So an infinity of solution paths is consistent
with the model.  Note, however, that y1
(2) = (a-1)/a > 1.0, so most of these solution paths
are explosive.
Of course there are other variables and conditions besides those discussed thus far
in a fully articulated model of the economy under discussion.  As for conditions, it is
typically true that a fully-specified optimizing analysis would require that
(21) lim Et b
j Mt+j/Pt+j = 0,
  jﬁ¥
i.e., that a transversality condition pertaining to real money balances must be satisfied.
Here b is a typical agent’s discount factor, b = 1/(1+r), with r > 0 and therefore
0 < b < 1.  Similarly, if one of the economy’s assets is government bonds, then another
condition necessary for individual optimality would be23
(22) lim Et b
j Bt+j/Pt+j = 0,
  jﬁ¥
Bt+1 being the number of bonds purchased by an agent at t for the price 1/(1+Rt) and
redeemed for one unit of money in t + 1.
We are now at last prepared to turn to the fiscalist theory.  With government
bonds recognized, we could write the consolidated
23 government budget constraint in per
capita terms as
(23) Pt (gt – txt) = Mt+1 – Mt + (1 + Rt)
-1 Bt+1 –Bt,
where gt and txt are real government purchases and (lump sum) tax collections,
respectively, in per-capita terms.  In real terms, this constraint could then be written as
(24) gt – txt = (Mt+1 – Mt)/Pt + (1 +Rt)
-1 (Pt+1/Pt) bt+1 - bt,
where bt = Bt/Pt.  Please note the mixed notation being utilized: bt = Bt/Pt whereas mt =
log Mt and pt = log Pt.  Condition (24) obtains for t = 1,2,….
Now consider the special case of the economy discussed above in which mt and
Mt are constant.  Also let the random shock vt be absent so that Pt+1 is correctly
anticipated in t.  Then with the real rate of interest rt defined by 1 + rt = (1 + Rt)/(1 + pt)
where pt = (Pt+1 – Pt)/Pt, and with rt = r as would be implied by optimizing behavior in
the absence of shocks,
24 the government budget constraint becomes
(25) bt+1 = (1 + r) bt + (1 + r) (gt – txt)                                t = 1,2,….
But since 1 + r > 1.0, if gt – txt is stationary (e.g., constant), the latter reveals a strong
tendency for bt to explode as time passes.  As t grows without limit, bt grows at the rate r,
                                               
23  The government consists of a fiscal authority and a central bank.
24    See, e.g., McCallum (1998).24
 i.e., behaves like (1+r)
t.  Thus the transversality condition (22) tends not to be satisfied
since growth of bt just precisely offsets the shrinkage of b
t = 1/(1 + r)
t, yielding a limit
that is a positive constant.
In fact, in this case there are just two paths for bt that, with gt – txt constant, will
satisfy (25) and also (22) for t = 1,2,….  One of these obtains if the value b1 equals
–(1 + r) (g – tx)/r, for then (25) implies that
(26) b2 = (1 + r) [-(1 + r) (g-tx)/r] + (1 + r) (g – tx)
              = (1 + r) (g – tx) [-(1+r)/r + 1] = (1 + r) (tx – g) /r
and that same value prevails in all succeeding periods.  But b1 = B1/P1, and B1 is the
number of nominal government bonds outstanding at the beginning of the initial period, t
= 1.  Thus if the price level in this first period, P1, adjusts to equal the value P1 =
B1r/(1 + r) (tx – g), then condition (22) as well as (25) will be satisfied.  Indeed, this is
precisely what the fiscalist theory predicts: P1 adjusts relative to B1 and g – tx so as to
satisfy the individual agents’ optimality condition (22).
But what about the necessary condition for money holdings, equation (12)?  Well,
the fiscalist answer is that although the path just described will not conform to the pt =
m - g fundamentals solution implied by (18), it can and will satisfy the alternative
solution pt = [(a - 1)/a] pt-1 + (m - g)/a for all t = 2,3,….
25  The price level P1, and thus p1,
is determined by B1 and the b1 necessary to satisfy (22), and subsequent Pt, pt values are
given by (19) with y1 = (a - 1)/a.  The price level is exploding as time passes, despite the
constant value of Mt, but all of the model’s equilibrium conditions including RE are
                                               
25   It might be asked why this relation does not determine p1 in relation to p0.  I am
unclear concerning the answer given by the proponents of the fiscal theory.25
satisfied nevertheless.  Since Pt and Bt are growing at the same (explosive) rate, while Mt
is constant, the outcome is rightfully regarded as highly “fiscalist.”
26
Now let us consider the one other path of bt that will, with gt – txt constant, satisfy
(12) and also (22).  It is that bt+1 = 0 for all t = 1,2,….  Clearly, this is satisfied with Bt+1 =
0 and in that case places no constraint on Pt values.  Thus these are free to obey pt = m -
g, as in (18).  Therefore this solution is the orthodox or monetarist solution.
27
So we end up with two RE solutions that represent two competing hypotheses
regarding price level behavior in the hypothetical economy under study.  It is an economy
in which the money stock is constant over time, all behavioral relations are constant, and
there are no stochastic disturbances impinging upon its agents or productive processes.
According to the monetarist hypothesis, the price level is constant through time at a value
that is proportional to the magnitude of the money stock, and no government bonds are
purchased by private agents.
28  By contrast, the fiscalist hypothesis implies that, despite
the constant money stock, the bond stock and the price level both explode as time
passes—but without violating any optimality condition for private agents because the
initial price level adjusts relative to the initial bond stock so as to make the real bond
                                               
26  There is a serious problem, however, with this solution: if tx – g < 0, then a negative
price level would be required for satisfaction of  (25) by the assumed value of b1.  This
problem is stressed by Buiter (1998, p. 20) and McCallum (1998, p. 8).
27  It is not obvious how (25) is satisfied with Bt+1 = 0  when tx – g > 0.  But in this case




t+1 is satisfied where bond supply b
S
t+1 satisfies (22)
and bond demand is b
D
t+1 = 0.  Buiter (1998, p. 17) argues that the fiscalist assumptions
“violate the normal rules for constructing a well-posed general equilibrium model.”  Also
see McCallum (1998, pp. 8-9).
28   This does not necessarily imply that none are offered for sale by the government.26
stock equal the single non-zero value that will permit the stock of real bonds to remain
constant and the transversality condition (22) to be satisfied.  Under this latter hypothesis,
the initial price level is proportional to the initial bond stock and the price level grows in
tandem with the bond stock.
In the introduction to this section, it was stated that the section would include not
only a description of the fiscal theory of the price level but also an explanation of why I
believe it to be empirically invalid.  The description that has been given pertains to only
one special case, and therefore fails to do justice to the richness of the fiscal proponents’
analysis.  But the nature of this special case is such that I think no additional words are




Let us conclude with a brief overview of the paper’s arguments.  The optimal
currency area concept is central to economic analysis of monetary unions, as it clearly
identifies the relevant optimizing tradeoff: extension of the area over which a single
currency is used enhances allocative efficiency but reduces the possibility of tailoring
monetary policy to the needs of different areas.  Empirical work has verified the
importance of various features of economies that make them strong or weak candidates
for a common currency arrangement, but existing studies do not permit actual
quantification of costs and benefits of adopting a common currency.  In that sense, the
OCA concept remains less than fully operational.
                                                                                                                                           
29  A brief but somewhat more general discussion of the interaction of monetary and fiscal
policy strategies is included in McCallum (1999a).27
Another relevant body of theory is that pertaining to currency crises.  Formal
models clarify various points concerning speculative attacks on fixed exchange rates, and
show how abrupt reserve losses and depreciations can occur rationally at times when no
major shocks are present.  These formal models also support the notion that a fixed (but
potentially adjustable) exchange regime is not a viable option for most nations, given
today’s mobility of financial capital.  The reason, according to the theory, is that
speculative attacks can succeed even if there is no current policy inconsistency if
governments have other policy objectives that may at some date take priority over the
support of a fixed exchange rate.
The third area discussed is the recently-developed fiscal theory of price level
determination.  It is emphasized that this theory is drastically different than monetarist
orthodoxy; it does not contend that fiscal behavior drives an accommodative monetary
authority, but rather that the price level basically mimics the pattern of the government
bond stock outstanding rather than base money when their paths differ drastically.  An
example is exposited in which there are two rational expectations solutions in an
economy with a constant money supply.  The monetarist solution is that the price level is
also constant whereas the fiscalist theory implies that the bond stock and price level both
explode as time passes (without violation of any private optimality conditions).  These
solutions may be viewed as competing hypotheses about the behavior of actual
economies, and the paper suggests that the monetarist hypothesis is the more likely to
prevail in actuality.28
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